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Public Opinion Supervision -
A Case Study of Media Freedom in China
1“We insist on ‘one hundred flowers blooming and one hundred schools of thought
contending.’ China’s news has freedom. But this freedom must obey and serve the
interest of protecting the state and the public.”
- Jiang Zemin1
Parallel to economic liberalization, the People’s Republic of China (China) has
witnessed a rise of investigative journalism with heroic accounts being trumpeted
across the nation since the late 1970s.2 It was believed that with the introduction of
capitalism and the consequent relaxation of media control,3 a degree of real press
freedom has crept into China’s society.4
In particular, scholars have highlighted a unique phenomenon known as “yulun
jiandu.”5 Literally, this means public opinion supervision, whereby the opinions from
the mass are mobilized to act as a check against the state, to influence court decisions
and to push for legislative or policy reforms. In the process, the media often plays a
1 Expressed by Jiang Zemin, former State Chairman and Party General Secretary of the People’s
Republic of China, to CBS reporter Mike Wallace on August 15, 2000. Quoted in, CHINA’S CENTURY:
THE AWAKENING OF THE NEXT ECONOMIC POWERHOUSE 367 (Laurence J. Brahm, ed., 2001). Chinese
names in this article are cited in their Chinese name order, family names first. The exception is that if
the authors themselves write in English and refer to their own names in a different order, the above rule
is not followed.
2 Famous works include LU YUE GANG, BIG COUNTRY, SMALL CITIZENS [Da Guo Gua Min] (1998) and
ZENG HUA FENG, THE INVESTIGATIVE REPORTER [Diao Cha Ji Zhe], 2004. Another notable example is
the television documentary, Focus, which attracts a daily audience up to 350 million. See Hugo De
Burgh, Kings without Crowns? The Re-emergence of Investigative Journalism in China, 25 MEDIA,
CULTURE & SOCIETY 801 at 802 (2003).
3 State subsidies were cut tremendously and in 1981, the ban on advertisement was lifted. The State
Press and Publications Administration required all major newspapers with the exception of party
newspapers to achieve independence by 1994. See Yuezhi Zhao, From Commercialization to
Conglomeration: The Transformation of the Chinese Press within the Orbit of the Party State, JOURNAL
OF COMMUNICATION 3 (2000).
4 Li Xiguang, Creeping Freedoms in China’s Press, in CHINA’S CENTURY, supra note 1 at 386.
5 See Conference on China-U.S. Public Opinion and Law 2004, jointly held by Centre for International
Communication Studies of Tsinghua University, Tsinghua Law School and Yale Law School, June
19-20, 2004, Tsinghua University, Beijing.
2critical role such that many perceive it as a positive force and some may simply
equate it to be a form of media monitoring.6
The power of the media is not only recognized in communication studies. Its
impact is also felt in the legal arena. This is evidenced in cases in which the outcome
of judicial decisions is altered and the fate of individuals is rewritten after media
exposure of the event. Thus, the media can play a powerful role in a justice system
which the court has failed to live up to. Indeed, Benjamin Liebman praises the
Chinese media as one of the most influential actors in the legal system over the last
decade.7 Neil J. Daimant et al. regard the media as a key legal actor in the battle for
access to justice.8
Despite the above positive appraisal, the sad reality is that media freedom has
suffered severe setbacks since 2004 with prosecution and imprisonment of editors,9
forced restructuring10 and suspension of liberal papers.11 It is difficult for one not to
6 See discussion in Yuezhi Zhao, Watchdogs on Party Leashes? Contexts and Implications of
Investigative Journalism in Post-Deng China, 1 (2) JOURNALISM STUDIES, 577 at 594 (2000).
7 Benjamin Liebman, “Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System,” 105
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1 (2005).
8 NEIL J. DIAMANT, STANLEY LUBMAN AND KEVIN J. O’BRIEN, ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA 10
(2005).
9 In June 2004, the general manager and the vice president of the outspoken Southern Metropolis Daily
(Nanfang Doushi Bao),were sentenced to eight and six years’ imprisonment for alleged corruption in
the distribution of editorial bonuses. Many regarded this an a revenge for the paper’s coverage of the
SARS report and the Sun Zhigang case in 2003. More than 2000 journalists petitioned for their release
which one of them was released in 2005. See Jonathan Watts, Print and be Damned – China’s Paper
Tigers Fight On: Beijing’s Iron Grip on News is Under Attack as this Week 2000 Journalists Urged the
Release of Jailed Colleagues, THE GUARDIAN, July 1, 2005 at 17.
10 The chief editor and his deputies of Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao) were removed. The move was
believed to be the newspaper’s outspoken stance and sustained coverage of official corruption and
social problems. See Press Freedom Takes Step Back under China’s Current Leaders, BBC
MONITORING, Jan. 2, 2006 at 1.
11 China Youth Daily (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao) was suspended for one month after printing an article
3sink into a pessimistic mood and dismiss the power of public opinion supervision to
be mere wishful thinking in a communist state.
Drawing on the literature of both communication and legal studies, I will argue,
however, that public opinion supervision was never meant to be a form of media
monitoring as its name might have suggested. In stark contrast to its literal meaning
and common perception, the official meaning of public opinion supervision, as stated
in the Study Guide of the China’s Communist Party (CCP), refers to supervision by
the mass, exercised through the media, under the leadership of the CCP, which the
latter plays a paramount role.12
Regardless which definition one adopts, inherent in the concept of public opinion
supervision is the conflicting and difficult relations between the public, the media and
the state. Theoretically, the Party is subject to the scrutiny of the public and the media
yet the latter are under the guidance of the Party. This conundrum has resulted in
different interpretations, negotiations and manipulation of the content of “public
opinion”13 under different conditions by the media and the Party. The dynamics
involve a sophisticated process taking place within the set boundaries of the political
by an academic criticizing the official version of the cause for foreign invasion into China in the two
World Wars. When the paper was resumed in February 2006, the chief editor was replaced. See
Editorial, Cracks in the Great Wall, ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 17-19, 2006 at 10.
12 STUDY HANDBOOK ON THE (TENTATIVE) REGULATIONS OF INTERNAL SUPERVISION OF THE CHINA’S
COMMUNIST PARTY (hereinafter STUDY HANDBOOK) [Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang Dang Nei Jian Dui
Tiao Li (Shi Xing) Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang Ji Lu Chu Fen Tiao Li Xue Xi Shou Ce] at 75 (2004).
13 For the ambiguity of the term “public opinion,” see discussion in SLAVKO SPLICHAL, PUBLIC
OPINION 1-52 (1999).
4order. Hence, I would argue that public opinion supervision should be seen as a
dynamic, interactive process involving the CCP, the media and the public to define the
substantive wrong in social problems, to frame pressing issues and to have the final
say in directing the course of social, legal or political development.
Palpably, it is fundamentally unrealistic to expect that media in China could be
the fourth estate or a ferocious watchdog in this battle. To shed light on its role, I like
to draw on the metaphor of a “guard dog media” 14 to analyze the intricate
relationship between the Chinese media and the authorities. The guard dog conception
is “different from the lapdog version in that it does assume a conflict role of media,
one that would not necessarily produce abject subservience.”15 The guard dog
occasionally sounds the alarm. “Conflict is reported but in a constrained way and only
on certain issues and under certain structural conditions.”16
To capture the delicate power game of public opinion supervision, and the
complex irony of dependency and autonomy of the Chinese media, this paper
examines the news coverage of a particular housing development and relocation
scandal in Hunan province.17 Though relocation projects are common in China,
extremely few disgruntled cases develop into social and legal problems that enjoy
14 George A. Donohue et al, A Guard Dog Perspective on the Role of Media, 45 J OF COMMUNICATION
115-132 (1995).
15 Id. at 120.
16 Id. at 116.
17 In my study, I interviewed the journalists, and lawyers that were directly involved in the case, and
sought the views of other journalists and academics in media studies. In total, I had conducted
interviews with nine journalists, two lawyers and three leading academics.
5“celebrity status” that are widely reported.18 Coverage of such cases is often sensitive
as it involves urban planning and policies of the local government.19 The significance
of reporting this case is that many could easily identify with the fate of the immediate
victims. Public imagination could be promptly captured and public opinion could be
readily aroused, facilitating supervision by the public and the media. In the battle of
public opinion supervision, the media teamed up with legal actors to sustain public
opinion and to build moral authority on all fronts.
Rather than perceiving the event merely as another media crusade successfully
yielding a particular legal result, I contend that the media and the law are interlocked
in a relationship of complementary interdependence. Without either one of them, the
result would have been different. Throughout the process, the media is an advocate
mobilizing public opinion and fighting for the recognition of legal order. The story
has been chosen to exemplify both the tacit coordination within the media sector and
the joint effort between the media and the relevant legal institutions to achieve a just
result as part of the uphill battle of making public opinion supervision works.
Underneath the seeming victory, the media and the legal actors knew their constraints.
They had to humbly acknowledge that it was not a total victory. Thus, the chosen case
18 Stephen Hilgartner and Charles Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model,
94(1) THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 57 (1988).
19 It was reported that 1.25 million people have been compulsorily moved in the past 15 years to areas
in distant suburbs. See Mark O’Neill, China: Media Censorship Alive and Well, BBC MONITORING,
Mar. 9, 2006 at 1.
6study also enables us to understand the power and limitations of the media; the
evolving relationship between the media and the state; and the relationship between
the media and legal regulation.
I. PUBLIC OPINION SUPERVISION BUT WHO IS THE SUPERVISOR?
Public opinion supervision is often seen as a refreshing and positive force in
China’s media landscape, though public opinion may run out of control triggering a
media trial.20 Nonetheless, China’s investigative reporting has contributed positively
to exposing official corruption and social problems. Public opinion supervision has
become increasingly important since the late 20th century. Landmark reports include
the Sun Zhigang investigation, the BMW case and the Liu Yong trial.21
20 In one case, a defendant who was sentenced to the death penalty by the court, remarked bitterly that
he was in fact sentenced and “executed” by the media, rather than by the court. This was the notorious
case of Zhang Jin Zhu, a local public security official in Zheng Zhou County of Hunan province who
knocked down a pedestrian while driving under the influence of alcohol in 1997. Without stopping, he
dragged the victim with his car for about 1500 meters, and knocked down another passer-by. The first
victim was killed and the second suffered serious injury. In the trial, Zhang was sentenced to death in
1998. He appealed but the sentence remained. As Zhang was widely portrayed by the media as an evil
monster, Zhang argued that the sentence was too heavy and he in fact had been condemned by the
media before the court’s sentence. See Yan Lei Shan, Who Killed Police Officer Zhang Jin Zhu? [Shei
Shai Le Gong An Zhang Jin Zhu?], April 8, 2005 at
http://news.163.com/05/0408/20/1GRFCV300001120T.html; and Liebman, supra note 7 at 69-70.
21 Sun Zhigang was a 27 year graphic designer who was beaten to death by police officers in a
detention centre for migrants in Guangzhou city when he failed to produce a temporary residence
permit. This happened on March 17, 2003. The incident was not reported by the media until more than
a month passed, the outspoken Southern Metropolis Daily covered the news on April 25. Discussion
spread like fire on the Internet. Beijing Youth Daily picked up the story. Because of the coverage, an
investigation team was set up by up the Government. On June 20, the China’s Custody and
Repatriation system was abolished by Premier Wen Jiaboa (State Council Decree No. 381). The BMW
case took place at the end of 2003. Sun Xiuwen drove a BMW and hit fatally a peasant in Hariban. The
issue was whether this was a case of intentional murder. In the trial, the Court ruled that it was an
accident. The media covered the case widely and questioned the links between Sun and higher officials
in the region. On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge decision. Public opinion did not change the
decision but discussion on the Internet was so heated that Party officials had to ban reporting of the
case and ordered websites to remove coverage and discussions of the case. The last case was about Liu
Yong, a triad leader in Liaoning province. Liu was sentenced to death on April 17, 2002. On appeal, his
7On a closer look, “public opinion supervision” is a fluid and malleable term,
carrying multi-layered meanings in the Chinese context. If public opinion refers to the
simple aggregation of individual opinion,22 the supervision that generated from this
force could be seen as a form of public acclamation on social or political problems.
However, this form may be dispersed, loosely organized and not widely heard. David
Lynch points out that public opinion is composed not of “ aggregates of individuals
secretly holding to their thoughts, but instead as people recognizing a problem,
producing conflicting ideas about what to do, considering those alternatives, and
trying to resolve the matter by building consensus for a line of action.”23 The logical
extension of “public opinion supervision” would seem to be supervision by the above
named force to halt various injustices in society. The role of the media is to reflect,
channel and mobilize this opinion into an expressed voice, turning public problems
into salient public issues, affecting outcomes of decisions. The media becomes
representatives and trustees of the public, translating raw public opinion into a
collective, supervising role. In this second sense, public opinion supervision could act
as a powerful critique of state power because the media offers a vision of spectacle
and a chance for participation to affect collective decision. However, one needs to
sentenced was reduced to life imprisonment. The media questioned whether this was a fair decision and
hinted at the personal connections between Liu and local officials. Waves of criticism came pouring in
on the Internet and the print media. The Supreme People’s Court had to intervene in December 2003
and reinstated the death sentence and Liu was executed within hours of the Court’s announcement. For
details of the case, see discussion Liebman, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 82-91.
22 Splichal, supra note 13 at 28.
23 DAVID LYNCH, AFTER THE PROPAGANDA STATE 24 (1999).
8note the above understanding is very different from the official definition.
Later discussion will show that the CCP has always claimed to be the true
spokesman of the “public.” This means that any supervision must ultimately take
place within the realm of social stability under the CCP leadership. In other words,
“public opinion supervision” is a misnomer because the ultimate source of
supervision remains to be China’s political leaders. Despite this, the media strives to
exercise genuine media monitoring by channeling public opinion to contest the
boundaries set by the ruling regime. Though public opinion rarely takes the form of
scientific opinion polls or empirical surveys in China, the media is eager to expose
malfeasance so that individuals can express their opinions on public events. Often,
what the media is doing is making controversial issues more salient and appropriate
for the expression of public sentiments and opinions so that pressure can be exerted to
resolve some of the most contentious social issues. Each round of covering a ground
breaking story is an attempt to negotiate and expand the scope for freedom in society
at large.
This part of the paper will outline the background of the rise of public opinion
supervision and explore its meaning so as to lay out the analytical framework for the
upcoming case study.
9A. Mouth and Throat, Ear and Nose, and the Next?
Under Maoist rule, China’s media performed an entirely different role. It was a
revolutionary instrument, better known as the CCP’s “mouth and throat.” Li Xiguang
remarked that in those days, negative reporting was non existent for “good news is
news, bad news is not news.”24 The media was entrusted with the task of preserving
social stability and promoting specific policies. Despite the fact that propaganda is a
“dirty” word in Western social science studies, conjuring shrewd manipulation and
thought control, there is nothing shameful about this term in China.25 Until the late
1990s, the Central Publicity Department was known as the Central Propaganda
Department (CPD),26 an organ of the CCP rather than a governmental department.27
It has always been the responsibility of the media to spread state propaganda, to
educate the public, to uphold Party policy, and to help the masses under Party
guidance.28
On the other side, the media were also instructed to be the “eyes and ears” of the
party. Journalists were expected to gather information and to reflect grassroots
24 Li, supra note 4 at 391.
25 Timothy Cheek, Redefining Propaganda: Debates on the Role of Journalism in Post-Mao Mainland
China, 25 ISSUES & STUDIES 47 at 51 (1989).
26 The Central Propaganda Department abandoned the sensitive word “propaganda” as a translation for
xuanchuan and opted for the word “publicity” and “information” for different official purposes. When
the head of CPD travels abroad on official visits, he is sometimes introduced as the Minister of
Information. See Perry Keller, Media Ownership & Regulation in China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 286 n. 38 (Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li, and Jan Michaiel Otto, eds.,
2002). In Chinese, the word “propaganda” is still used. CPD in Chinese is still known as Zhong Xuan
Bu.
27 Its responsibility is to overlook the media industry, set Party media policy and supervise the work of
the provincial level party propaganda bureaus. Keller, id.
28 Cheek, supra note 25 at 55.
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problems and grievances for limited circulation within the government. 29 Judy
Polumbaum has characterized China’s media to be both a form of hegemonic and
petitionary communication in which the governors address the governed and the
governed address the governors.30 Thus, the media were the bridge between the Party
and the people but not a mediator between them. Ostensibly, what was absent was the
checking of state power by the media and the mass.
However, China’s media experienced drastic structural and functional changes
after 1978. In 1979, for the first time the media were allowed to accept advertising.31
In 1983, the broadcasting system was decentralized, leaving only China Central
Television (CCTV) under central Party supervision.32 In 1992, after Deng Xiaoping’s
visit to the South, the State Press and Publications Administration required all major
newspapers, apart from a few central party organs, to become financially self-
sufficient by 1994.33 In 1996, the Ministry of Propaganda sanctioned the first
newspaper conglomerate.34 In July 2003, the CPD abolished the requirement that
29 These were known to be “internal references” [neibu wenjian]. See Marlowe Hood, The Use and
Abuse of Mass Media by Chinese Leaders During the 1980s, in CHINA’S MEDIA, MEDIA’S CHINA 23 at
39 (Chin Chuan Lee, ed., 1994).
30 Judy Polumbaum, The Tribulations of China’s Journalists after a Decade of Reform, IN VOICES OF
CHINA: THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND JOURNALISM 33 (Chin Chuan Lee, ed., 1990).
31 Roya Akhavan-Majid, Mass Media Reform in China: Toward a New Analytical Framework, 66 (6)
GAZETTE 553 at 557 (2004).
32 See Yu Huang, Peaceful Evolution: the Case of Television Reform in Post-Mao China, 16 MEDIA,
CULTURE & SOCIETY 217-241 (1994).
33 Zhao, supra note 3 at 6.
34 The first one is the Guangzhou Daily conglomerate, a municipal paper which is allowed to invest in
stock and property markets, to set up newspaper kiosks, to publish a series of minor papers and to
manage a series of profitable media and non-media enterprises. See Eric Kit-wai Ma, Rethinking Media
Studies: The Case of China, in DE-WESTERNIZING MEDIA STUDIES 22 (James Curran and Myung-Jin
Park eds., 2000). 
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forced party and state entities to subscribe to CCP newspapers.35 In essence, the Party
gave clear signals to media institutions that they had to become financially
independent and profit earning entities. These various important reforms triggered
changes in the media structure and outlook.
Strictly speaking, there is no independent press in China. Privately owned or
civilian organized owned newspapers are not allowed. Rather, China’s printed media
is largely divided into Party and non-Party organs. The leading newspapers are the
Party papers, directly controlled and responsible to the CCP and each province has its
own party paper. The leading Party paper is the People’s Daily and the party central
television mouthpiece is CCTV. Non-party media belong to and are supervised by
major party organs, government departments or their sub-units or semi-official
organizations such as women’s associations or trade unions.36 Each ministry or
ministry level department runs its own newspaper. For example, the Legal Daily
belongs to the Ministry of Justice. The famous Beijing Youth Daily is an unofficial
paper belonging to the Beijing Communist Youth League. In sum, each newspaper has
its own rank, depending on its position on the administrative ladder.37 Within the
35 Document 19 of Central Propaganda Department, issued in July 2003, quoted in “Notification on
Further Regulation on Compulsory Subscription by Government Department,” [Zhong Xuan Bu Guo
Wu Yuan Jiu Feng Ban Xin Wen Whu Ban Shu Fa Chu Tong Zhi—Jin Yi Bu Gui Fan Dang Zheng Bu
Men Bao Kan Zheng Ding Gong Zuo], PEOPLE’S DAILY, July 26, 2004 at
http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/1027/2664432.html
36 Chengju Huang, China’s State-Run Tabloids: The Rise of “City Newspapers,” 63 GAZETTE (5), 435
(2001).
37 This ranges from a ministry (bu), a bureau (jug), a branch (chu) to a section (key). See discussion in
Pan Zhongdang, Spatial Configuration in Institutional Change: A Case of China’s Journalism Reforms,
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above framework, there are increasing numbers of variations caused largely by the
urgent need to be financially independent: city newspapers, 38 evening papers,
weekend editions, press conglomerates, joint-venture papers and a contracting out
press system39 have blossomed quickly.
To attract readers and advertisers, these new entities have to be bold, aggressive
and reader-oriented. This reality has directly contributed to the rise of a
“semi-independent press,” characterized to be “semi-official Chinese media that enjoy
independence in editorial, personnel and financial matters but are without any
independent legal status.”40 In the midst of structural changes, investigative reporting
becomes a popular form of news coverage. Thus, the economic reforms since the
1980s have gradually but effectively transferred a degree of media control from the
Party to the market and indirectly expanded the scope of media freedom.
B. Publicity Company, Investigative Journalism or Public Opinion Supervision?
The push and pull of market forces have landed the China media on a new
1:3 JOURNALISM, 253 at 258 (2000).
38 Since the mid-1990s, major provincial press organs have established a large number of highly
commercialized and urban-reader oriented daily newspapers to attract readership. They are known as
city newspapers, often in the form of evening news. See Huang, supra note 36 at 435.
39 Regardless of whether a newspaper is officially registered in the name of, and supervised by,
government departments or their sub-units or semi-official organizations, it can contract out to
individuals or groups who enjoy editorial, personnel and financial independence provided the
license-holder pays a fixed sum. Take the Beijing Youth Daily, it is under the governance of the Beijing
Communist Youth League but has been contracted out to its staff and enjoys the reputation of being an
avante-garde liberal newspaper in the nation.
40 Chengju Huang, The Development of a Semi-Independent Press in Post-Mao China: An Overview
and A Case Study of Chengdu Business News, 1 JOURNALISM STUDIES (no. 4) 649 at 650 (2000).
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plateau. It now has to serve two masters – not to offend the Party and to please the
market. Chin Chuan Lee writes that China’s “schizophrenic market-orientated media”
has a capitalist body but wears a socialist face.41 Summed up succinctly by Zhao
Yuezhi, the media has to “[dance] skillfully between the party line and the bottom line,
these papers seek a middle road between traditional party organs and marginal
lifestyle and crime tabloids and create a propagandist-commercial model of
journalism that pleases the leaders and the ordinary readers at the same time.”42
In fact, the above is a survival and winning formula for all China’s
commercialized media. Lee cynically describes China’s media as having changed
from being a Party mouthpiece to a Party publicity corporation.43 Rather than
brainwashing people, the media is now assigned tasks to resolve social conflict, to
promote Party legitimacy and to help halting rising corruption at the lower levels of
the government.
How should one then characterize the nature of investigative journalism in China?
Before answering this question, one should perhaps pause to clarify the meaning of
investigative journalism. Hugo de Burgh defines it as a form of “extensive research by
one or more journalist to uncover matters which affect the citizenry of the society in
which the journalist lives and of which the society generally does not approve but is
41 Chin Chuan Lee, Servants of the State or the Market?: Media and Journalists in China, in MEDIA
OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS: A READER 241 at 246 (Jeremy Tunstall, ed., 2001).
42 Zhao, supra note 33 at 10-11.
43 Lee, supra note 41 at 246.
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unaware.” 44 Its flavour is adversarial, representing a critical, emancipatory tradition
appealing to universal values.45 In China, the attempt to adopt this muck-raking,
revelatory style of reporting can be traced to the late 1970s, with the famous reporter
Liu Binyan being a brave voice.46 The passion is still alive in contemporary times.
It would, however, be too quick to equate the Chinese style of investigative
expose to a form of investigative journalism or a pure form of media monitoring as
understood in liberal studies. As indicated earlier, it is important to remember that
China’s media is still an arm of the state and public opinion supervision must take
place under the larger umbrella of Party supervision and guidance. Chinese leaders are
careful to direct the rising passion and power of investigative journalism into a
specific form of “public opinion supervision.”
The term was coined by the then Premier Zhao Ziyang in the 13th Central
Committee of the Communist Party (CCCP) of China in 1987, where he urged the
media to report on political and Party affairs so as to achieve the purpose of“public
opinion supervision.”47 In the address, he did not mention the mouthpiece role of the
press but highlighted three principles of news work: the press should exercise
oversight over the work and conduct of public officials, should inform the public of
44 De Burgh, supra note 2 at 806.
45 Id.
46 Zhao, supra note 6 at 578.
47 Report Delivered at the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 25,
1987 at http://redweb.tsinghua.edu.cn/shiwuda/1-15/cf13.htm.
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important events and it should reflect public debate on important issues.48 This was
echoed by the subsequent Party Secretary Jiang Zemin in the CCCP meetings in
1992,49 199650 and 199751 respectively.
In 1997, Xiao Yang, President of China’s Supreme People’s Court called upon
all courts to put themselves under the scrutiny of the media.52 Despite this rosy image,
“public opinion supervision” was formally stipulated under the (Tentative)
Regulations of Internal Supervision of the China’s Communist Party in 2003.53 Under
section 5, it stipulates specifically that internal supervision within the Party must go
hand in hand with external supervision. The latter includes supervision by the media.
Under section 33, media supervision must take place under the guidance of the Party
so as to achieve an optimal and ideal form of public opinion supervision. Immediately
following, in section 34, the media is required to adhere to Party principles, media
professional ethics, to direct public opinion to the right course and be aware of the
social impact of public opinion supervision. The term “public opinion supervision” is
not defined in the Regulations but understood to mean supervision by the mass,
48 See discussion in Polumbaum, supra note 30 at 42.
49 Report Delivered at the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 12,
1992 at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5106/20010430/456648.html.
50 Report Delivered at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 10,
1996 at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5106/20010430/456601.html.
51 Characteristics Into the 21st Century-- Report Delivered at the 15th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997 at http://xibu.tjfsu.edu.cn/elearning/lk/15c.htm
52 Zhao, supra note 6 at 581.
53 Promulgated by the Central Committee of the China’s Communist Party on Dec. 31, 2003.
16
exercised through the media.54 It is explicitly stated in the Study Guide that public
opinion supervision can only take place under the leadership of the Party.55 The
media are warned that they are not the fourth estate but part of the Party. They are
reminded once again that they are the mouth and throat, ear and eyes of the Party and
the people.56 They should not model themselves on the Western media.57 Most of all,
the Party should never been put into an oppositional position with the media.58 Other
than exposing social problems, the media should help to solve conflicts and problems
in society.59 The prime concern is always the maintenance of “social stability,”60 to
assist the state rather than adding to its burden (yao bang mang bu yao tian luan).61
The above legal rhetoric is affirmed in various policy directions in 2005,62 and it has
also been implemented in different ways by local officials. It was reported that
internet commentators have also been recruited by local governments in 2005 to
redirect public opinion to the “right course” of discussion on the internet.63 Their
54 STUDY HANDBOOK, supra note 12 at 75.
55 Ren Tian Ying, Treating Public Opinion Supervision Seriously and Correctly[Ren Zhen Dui Dai He
Zheng Que Kai Zhan Xin Wen Yu Lun Jian Du in Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang Dang Nei Jian Du Tiao
Li], in THE STUDY GUIDE, supra note 12 at 268.
56 Id. at 270.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 270-271.
60 278
61 281.
62 See Notice on the Strengthening and Improving Public Opinion Supervision by the State
Administration of Radio, Film and Television [Guang Dian Zong Ju Yin Fa Guan Yu Qie Shi Jia Qiang
He Gai Jin Guang Bo Dian Shi Yu Lun Gong Zuo De Yao Qiu De Tong Zhi], issued on May 10, 2005
at http://www.sarft.gov.cn/manage/publishfile/35/2926.html
63 Cao Yun Wu, Su Qian: Directing the Implementation of Public Opinion Supervision [Su Qian: Yin
Dao Wang Luo Yu Lun Shi Jian], SOUTHERN WEEKEND [Nanfang Zhaomou], May 19, 2005 at A5. It
was reported that at least Nanjing, Wu Shi and various cities in Jiansu province have hired their teams
of online commentators to direct public opinion.
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duties are to counter-balance any pessimistic views and to explain the government
stance. What is important to note is that these commentators still express their
opinions in their capacities as ordinary citizens, rather than government spokesmen.
Clearly, in view of the above legislative and policy directions, the Party is calling
for media restraint. It is determined to retain its established role as the helmsman of
social reform. The pressing issue then becomes whether the Party’s current insistence
on exerting control over the media can halt the liberating force that has been
unleashed by the market for more than two decades. A semi-independent press is
forming and the passion of public opinion has already been inflamed. The relationship
of the media with the Party and with the public has, thus, entered into a fluid state of
uncertainty and possibility.
II. UNLEASHING THE GUARD DOG
We have seen while this guard dog has been awakened from its slumber, it is still
under the firm discipline of the Party. The following case analysis will illustrate the
interplay between political and media power in the coverage of a scandal. One can
also witness the alliance between the media and legal justice in the face of oppressive
political power.
18
A. Cultural Revolution Relived
The case reviewed here concerned a land development project in the county
seat of Jiahe, under the jurisdiction of Chen Zhou Municipal government in Hunan
Province. Land development, relocation of properties and expropriation of proprieties
are by-products of China’s rapid urban development and modernization. They are not
necessarily seen as social evils because residents may have a chance to get a sizable
amount of compensation or a new residential unit. It is equally true that there are
many grievances when people are forced to leave homes which are associated with
their family histories, values and fond memories.64 In some cases, houses are
expropriated without reasonable compensation.65
The case in dispute involved a 120,000 square meter land project in the
down-town area of Jiahe, affecting 1100 households and 7000 people.. The county
government had sold the land to a developer in July 2003 to construct a commercial
area. Existing houses on the land which were mostly built after 1990 or even after
2000 had to be demolished. The whole project would have affected approximately one
64 See Ian Johnson’s account of the redevelopment and disputes in Beijing. IAN JOHNSON, WILD GRASS:
CHINA’S REVOLUTION FROM BELOW, 87-182 (2005).
65 For a comprehensive account of legal disputes and regulations, see Wang CAILIANG, DISPUTES ON
DEMOLITION OF HOUSES [FANG WU CHAI QIAN JIU FEN JIAO DIAN SHI YI] (2004). The county
government had also hung out banners with imperative orders written on them. The slogans read “Who
Affected Jiahe for a while, I will affect him for Life.”[Shui Ying Xiang Jia He Fa Zhan Yi Zhen Zi, Wo
Ying Xiang Ta Yi Bei Zi]; “Who Does not Care about the honour of Jiahe, whose hat will be taken off”
[Shui Bu Gu Jia He De Mian Zi, Shui Jiu Bei Zhai Mao Zi] ,and “Who does not co-operate, he will be
replaced [Shui Gong Zuo Tong Bu Kai Mian Zi, Shui Jiu Yao Huan Wei Zi]. The banners were hung on
December 14, 2003, see reports by Luo Chang Ping, Demolition Project in Hunan Caused Sisters to
Petition for Divorce on the Same Day [Hu Nan Jia He Xian Chai Qian Yin Fa Yi Dui Jie Mei Tong Ri
Li Hun], BEIJING NEWS, May 8, 2004 at http://news.qq.com/a/2004508/000033.htm.
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fifth of residents in the county seat.66 Other than the fact that the compensation rate
was unreasonable, what was most striking and outrageous in this case was the direct
interference of the local government through drastic and barbaric administrative
orders. Throughout the year of 2003, despite attempts by residents to solve the
problems through administrative channels and legal means, this was of no avail. As a
last resort, the residents sought help from the media as a result of which, in the short
period of one month in 2004, a media relay commenced, turning the tide of events
On August 7, 2003, the county government initiated an administrative order,
entitled ‘Four Guarantees and Two Stops” (Si Bao Liang Ting).67 The order was not
directed at the residents who lived in the affected area, but any civil servants who had
blood ties with the affected residents. They had to guarantee that their family
members or relatives would (a) finish assessment of property compensation within the
said time frame; (b) sign any related documents; (c) vacate the property and handed in
the compensation and vacation document; (d) and promise not to appeal and not to
bring the case to the attention of the Central authorities if they were not satisfied with
the agreement. On top of this, this group of civil servants had to report daily to the
county government, otherwise their salaries would be frozen and their jobs would be
66 1100 households, 7000 residents, 20 units and organizations out of the county seat population of
30,000 would be affected. See SOCIAL RECORD, THE PAIN OF DEMOLITION [Shehui Ji Lu –Chai Qian
Zhi Tong], (CCTV television broadcast May 26, 2004) available at
http://www.cctv.com/news/society/20040526/100912.shtml.
67 Jiahe County Document No. 136 of 2003[Zhu Quan Shang Mao Cheng Che Qian Hu “Si Bao” Ze
Ren Gong Zuo Tong Zhi]. 
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suspended with the possibility of being dismissed or relocated to far off districts. In
the first phase of relocation, 300 households and 160 civil servants were caught under
the new order. These oppressive measures were reminiscent of the Cultural
Revolution, where sons and daughters of landlords, entrepreneurs or intellectuals were
punished solely for their family background. 68 Such systems of collective
responsibility are meant to create a self-policing network that compels people’s
submission to authority. They can be traced to imperial style of governing in the Qin
dynasty.69Facing such oppressive measures, four residents from the affected area went
to Beijing to petition the Ministry of Construction but to no avail.70 By the time of
April 21, 2004, the patience of the county government and the developer had run out.
The County’s People’s Court sent out two hundred police to remove uncooperative
residents. Three residents who stayed on the roof-top as a sign of protest, were
detained for obstructing officials from carrying out their duties.
68 The county government was later criticized by the media for invoking an imperial style of
punishment under which one’s criminal culpability could extend to nine clans. See Oriental Horizon
[Shi Kong Lian Xian], Investigation of Demolition Project in Jiahe I: Extending Responsibility to Nine
Clans [Jiahe Chai Qian Diao Cha Zhi Yi: “Zhu Lian Jiu Zu] (CCTV television broadcast, May 13,
2004), available at www.cctv.com/news/society/20040513/101129.shtml.
69 The practice had its roots in the Qin dynasty (221-206 B.C.) and was formally abolished as part of
the Qing law reforms in 1905. For details, see Joanna Waley-Cohen, Collective Responsibility in Qing
Criminal Law, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 112 (Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman
and R. Kent Guy, eds., 2000). The extent of members that would fall within the nine clans is a topic of
controversy. Generally, it would include members of one’s father’s, mother’s, spouse’s, siblings’ sons’
and daughters’ families. For discussion, see Zhang Jian Guo, CHINESE LAW IN IMPERIAL AGE [DI ZHI
SHI DAI DE ZHONG GUO FA], 129-159 (1999).
70 From interview with Luo Chang Ping, reporter of Beijing News, who covered the Jiahe scandal. The
interview took place on June 26, 2004, Beijing.
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B. Soft News on Hard Life
Up to that point, the event was not covered by any media. It was not because the
media were ignorant of the dispute and confrontation. Rather, local newspapers dared
not publish the story.71 Local media have great difficulty in flexing their muscles in
their own territories. The reason that Beijing News went to cover the story was that
one resident at Jiahe, Lu Shui De who was over 70 years old, went all the way to
Beijing to beg the newspaper for help.72 Lu was one of the residents who petitioned
the Ministry of Construction in Beijing and who was later detained in the forced
demolition process.
Reporter Luo Chang Ping was from Hunan himself and was on leave at that time.
On his way home, his editor asked him to pick up the story with the specific
instruction to “concentrate on the social impact.” Immediately, Luo went to Jiahe on
April 28, 2004 and started the investigation but most residents were hostile to him as
other reporters had got them into trouble. The local officials were not responsive and
even threatened to lock him up if he continued to take photos. When he finally
secured an interview with Zhou Xian Yong, the County Party Secretary of Political
and Legal Affairs, Luo was snubbed for his newspaper was unknown in the area.
71 Luo Chang Ping, the reporter of Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao), who was the first to break the news to
the rest of the nation, stated that three local and regional newspapers went to cover the stories. They
were West Times [Xi Bu Shi Bao], China’s Construction News [Zhong Guo Jian She Bao] and Southern
Economic News [(Nanfang Cai Jing Bao). However, when they sent their drafts to the county
government for comments, their stories were banned and they even got the residents into trouble.
Interview with Luo, id.
72 Interview with Luo, id.
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Zhou simply paraded the official documents in front of Luo and admitted there was no
public tender for the land project.
What Zhou did not realize was that Beijing News was a newly established press
group in Beijing in 2003. It is China’s first cross-geographical press entity, under the
joint control of Guangming Daily and Southern Daily News Group (Nanfang Ri
Bao).73 The former is a Party paper based in Beijing and the latter owns the
well-known liberal paper, Southern Weekend, in Guangzhou. Beijing News is,
therefore, a rare liberal breed blessed with powerful backing. This press group has
quickly risen to fame,74 sharing significant mass popularity with Beijing Youth Daily.
The lack of alertness of the county official only served to hasten the publication
of the scandal on May 8, 2004.75 Rather than focusing on the marked irregularity of
the administrative order and the unfair deal, the story probed into the reasons behind a
sudden rise of divorce in the small county of Jiahe, featuring a story of two sisters
divorcing their husbands on the same day. It was an indirect but piercing criticism of
the “Four Guarantees and Two Stops” policy in which families were forced to break
up so that their members would not be affected.
73 BBC Monitoring, China: New Beijing Paper Product of Cross-Regional Cooperation, Oct. 28, 2003
at 1.
74 As of March 29, 2005, the daily circulation of Beijing News was 400,000 and revenue from
advertisement has reached more than RMB$450 million. Beijing News, Achievement after Structural
Changes, [Xin Jing Bao Gai Ban Sheng Ji: Hao De Geng Xu Yao Gai Bian] March 29, 2005
(pamphlet).
75 Luo Chang Ping, Demolition Project in Hunan Caused Sisters to Petition for Divorce on the Same
Day [Hu Nan Jia He Xian Chai Qian Yin Fa Yi Dui Jie Mei Tong Ri Li Hun], BEIJING NEWS, May 8,
2004 at http://news.qq.com/a/2004508/000033.htm.
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The newspaper story was quickly spotted by Oriental Horizon of CCTV and its
team of journalists went to the county to investigate. Being the Party’s main electronic
media outlet and a TV station, the news team had access to residents and local
officials but this did not mean they could exercise their policing power so easily.
When they arrived in Jiahe on May 9, they found local officials were waiting for them
at the hotel. Their counter-strategy was to break the news team into two groups to
start their investigation and interviews. In their programmes, they focused sharply and
directly onto the problems. In contrast with Beijing News, CCTV attacked the
administrative policy and the legitimacy of the entire redevelopment project.76 It
fought for the “extension of reportable truth” on the legal front.77
In the course of interviewing Professor Zhang Guo Qing, a leading academic in
political science and public administration at Peking University, the programme
condemned the abuse of power and law. The legitimacy of the “Four Guarantees and
Two Stops Policy” was questioned by Professor Zhang, who denounced it as in direct
contradiction of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative
Supervision,78 as against Party Rules of the CCP79 and article 27 of the China’s
76 Oriental Horizon, supra note 68. The first series started with a story about a nurse called Li Jing
whose mother lived in the affected area and who refused to sign the agreement with the developer. Li
was removed from her hospital and her salary was suspended. Frightened of the affect on her husband,
she applied for divorce but was refused by the government. During the 10 month period, people were
relocated from work units, divorce rates increased, family disputes became prevalent. At least four
couples got divorced, six got demoted or dismissed and four were relocated due to the policy.
77 WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 228 (1965).
78 The Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision, adopted at the 25th
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress of the People's Republic
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Constitution which stipulates that all state organs must accept supervision by the
people. In its second series, the programme interviewed a legal expert and local
officials of Jiahe.80 This further exposed the legal atrocities involved in the deal. It
was revealed that there was no public tender for the project; the developer had
managed to start the project before getting the development permit, and, what was
more, the county government had exempted the developer from tax payments, the
planning fee and even reimbursed part of the development fee to the developer. Both
the government and the developer would have had violated article 7 of the
Administration of the Demolition and Removal of Urban Housing Regulations,81 and
article 12 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Urban Real Estate
Administration.82 After taking into account the abuse of process designed to benefit
the developer, it became clear that the land had only cost the developer RMB$30 per
square meter, 3.7% of the market value of RMB$800 to $1200.
In exposing this marked malfeasance, CCTV seemed to be winning the battle.
of China on May 9, 1997. Article 6 of the Regulations entitles every citizen to bring the attention of a
supervisory body to any maladministration of government bodies.
79 The Rules of the Chinese Communist Party [Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang Zhang Cheng]
2002.11.14 at http://www.bjdj.gov.cn/ bjdj.
80 Oriental Horizon, Investigation of Jiahe’s Demolition Project I I: Suspicion on Demolition [Shi
Kong Lian Xian, Jia He Chai Qian Diao Cha Zhi Er: Chai Qian Yi Yun], (CCTV television broadcast,
May 14, 2004), available at www.cctv.com/news/society/20040514/100638.shtml.
81 Administration of the Demolition and Removal of Urban Housing Regulations [Cheng Shi Chai
Qian Guan Li Tiao Li] Promulgated by the State Council on June 6, 2001, announced by State Council
Document No. 305 on June 13, 2001, effective on November 1, 2001.
82 Law of the People's Republic of China on Urban Real Estate Administration [Zhong Hua Ren Min
Gong He Guo Cheng Shi Fang Di Chan Guan Li Fa] Promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 8th
National People’s Congress on July 5, 1994, President Decree No. 29 on July 5, 1994; Effective on
January 1, 1995.
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However, that was an uphill fight. When the Oriental Horizon team was still in Hunan,
they went to Chen Zhou municipal planning to transmit its film clips back to
Beijing.83 To their disappointment, their request was blocked by the municipal
government. The team was forced to make a four-hour trip rushing to Guangdong to
make the transmission. The clips arrived safely and just made it for the first broadcast
at 7:15 in the morning on May 12, 2004. Timing was critical as officials from Jiahe
and Chen Zhou arrived in Beijing shortly afterwards at 8:00 on the same day,
attempting to stop the broadcast. After the second series was broadcast for the first
time, Yan Xinyu, the director of Oriental Horizon, was notified that re-broadcast of
the series would be cancelled.84 In addition, the subsequent series would have to be
suspended and further investigation had to be stopped for the time being. Yan did not
receive any explanation. Facing uncertainty and the unknown, it seemed that the
media had lost their battle. Worse still, back in Jiahe, the local officials held a town
hall meeting ferociously rebuking the residents for speaking to reporters. The three
who were detained were formally arrested on May 15.
Forced demolition continued. In this seemingly bleak situation, a media relay
started. A reporter from Beijing Youth Daily went to Jiahe to follow up the story. The
paper is affiliated with the Beijing Communist Youth League but is a
83 Interview with Yan Xin Yu, Director of Oriental Horizon, CCTV, on June 24, 2004, in Beijing.
84 Documentary programmes on CCTV are often repeatedly broadcast three to four times in a week.
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semi-independent paper as it has been contracted out to its staff. It has built a
reputation of being aggressive, ambitious and energetic.85 When Zeng Pangyu, a
reporter from Beijing Youth Daily, went to Jiahe, he could not secure any interviews
with the officials. According to Zeng’s interpretation, the officials simply dismissed
him, thinking that they had successfully beaten CCTV and no newspaper could match
them.86 After the CCTV broadcast, the local residents had high hopes of the media
and warmly welcomed Zeng, passing him various pieces of information. Zeng found
out that the administrative policy of “Four Guarantees Two Stops” had not stopped at
all, the explanation of the officials to CCTV was that the commercial project was
critically important to raising funds to avert the flooding problem. This was a lie.87
The three residents detained had been formally arrested for obstructing officials from
carrying out their duties. In his report, Zeng boldly mentioned that the second series
of Oriental Horizon was suddenly cut off.88
In the meantime, different media groups joined the battle. Other documentary
groups in CCTV, who are supposed to be rivals to Oriental Horizon, also went to the
85 ZHENG XINGDONG, NEWS WAVE: A STUDY OF BEIJING YOUTH DAILY [XIN WEN CHONG JI BO: BEIJING
QING NIAN BAO XIAN XIANG SAO MIAO] (1994).
86 Interview with Zeng Pengyu, reporter of Beijing Youth Daily, June 29, 2004, Beijing.
87 In the second series of the CCTV program, Jiahe’s official humbly confessed their policy might be
too radical and they would re-assess the policy. The official explained that the redevelopment project
was necessary to avert flooding in that area and it was crucial to attract investment. However, Zeng
found out that flooding took place in an entirely different part of the county.
88 Zeng Pengyu, Demolition at Jiahe Continues: “4 Guarantees and 2 Stops” Have In Fact Never
Stops, [Jia He Qiang Zhi Chai Qian Reng Zai Jin Xing, Si Bao Liang Ting”Gen Ben Wei Ting”]
BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, May 19, 2004 at http://news.qq.com/a/20040519/000130.htm; and Zeng Pengyu,
Who is Lying in Jiahe’s Demolition: County Officials Repenting and Arresting Locals at the Same
Time,[Jia He Chai Qian Shui Zai Sa Huang: Xian Ling Dao Bian Chan Hui Bian Dai Bu Chai Qian Hu]
BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, May 22, 2004 at http://news.qq.com/a/20040522/000172.htm.
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county to start their investigation.89 Beijing News and Beijing Youth Daily had
managed to keep the story alive and on the radar screen of their readers. By that time,
the story had been widely circulated in the Internet and public opinion had been
successfully stirred up, with a hit rate of five million and attracting 40,000 discussion
messages per day by mid May of 2004.90
Meanwhile, Yan, the director of Oriental Horizon, finally got a green signal on
May 28 to continue to broadcast the fruits of his investigation. The third and the
fourth series were broadcast on May 28 and May 31. By that time, matters had
suddenly improved. The three arrested persons were released and local officials were
removed. Beijing Youth Daily covered the last episode on June 2, 2004. But Yan and
Zeng got signals from their leaders that this was the furthest that investigation could
go as it was near June 4, the sensitive date that the students’ movement and
suppression took place in 1989. All reporters are bound by the golden rule of
maintaining stability. The closing remark was delivered on June 4 when Premier Wen
Jiabao condemned the Jiahe scandal.91
The final words on the media investigation were not uttered by any of the media
89 Social Record covered the story, see supra note 66. Other teams include Economic Investigation in
Half an Hour and Focus, which also reported the story. See Xiao Shan, A Weighing of Strategies and
Counter-strategies [“Bai Ping” Yu “Fan Bai Ping” De Jiao Liang] 34 ORIENTAL OUTLOOK ( Liao Wang
Dong Fang Zhou Kan), July 8, 2004 at 41.
90 Xiao Shan, supra note 89 at 42.
91 Wen Jia Bao Presiding the State Council Meeting, Agrees How Jiahe Demolition Incident Should be
Handled [Wen Jiabao Zhu Chi Guo Wu Yuan Hui Yi ,Tong Yi Jia He Chai Qian Shi Jian De Chu Li],
June 4, 2004, Xinhua News, reported at http://news.qq.com/a/20040604/000568.htm.
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institutions mentioned above, but instead came from Oriental Outlook, a magazine
run by Xinhua News Group (the New China News Agency). Rather than criticizing
the legal wrongs in the case, it viewed the story as a dedicated CCP leader in Jiahe
county who had caused suffering to the people out of good intentions but poor
implementation.92 At the same time, it also had a special issue praising the reporters
who covered the scandal.93 Tang Hua, a senior editor of Xinhua News, stated that a
balance had to be struck with each piece of reporting and it was also important to let
the local officials explain.94 While this might be a valid comment, in general about
media professionalism, the tone that Oriental Outlook struck was markedly
sympathetic to the local officials.
Luo, Yan and Zeng were not satisfied with the outcome and with the mediator
role played by Oriental Outlook. They suspected that corruption or inside dealings
were involved but they did not have enough evidence and could not dig further.
C. Shall We Hire a Lawyer or a Journalist?
If the media is like the beam of searchlight that moves restlessly to bring
episodes out of darkness into vision, society cannot be governed merely by the
92 Yu Lei Yan et a., “The Best” County Party Secretary and A Failed Communist Party Member [“Zui
Hao” De Xian Wei Shu Ji He Zui Shi Bai De Gong Chan Dang Yuan], 33 ORIENTAL OUTLOOK, 38-47
(July 1, 2004). 
93 Xiao Shan, supra note 89.
94 Interview with Tang Hua, Senior Editor if Xinhua News Agency and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of
Oriental Outlook, July 12, 2004 in Beijing.
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exposure of episodes, incidents and eruptions.95 The remedy must lie where the cause
is.
Apart from securing media attention, the case caught the attention of the
Constitutional and Human Rights Centre of Beijing Tsinghua University, who invited
lawyers to help. One of them, Xiao Tai Fu, worked hard for the release of the three
arrested.96 This might have explained why an investigation team was formed from the
Central, the provincial and the municipal levels on May 24,97 breaking the deadlock
in reporting.
As the three residents were detained and arrested under s. 227 of the Criminal
Code for obstructing officials from carrying out duties, the challenge was about on the
legal concept of obstruction. The Code itself specifically requires the threat of violent
force or violence but the three detainees were merely sitting passively on the roof tops
of their houses, Xiao argued that it would hardly constitute violence or the threat of
using violent means. This was accepted by the court. Not only were the three released
but Xiao and his colleagues also launched an administrative action on behalf of the
three arrested and ask for compensation during their unlawful detention. In the end,
95 Lippmann, supra note 77 at 229.
96 Interview with Xiao Tai Fu, a Beijing lawyer, on July 7, 2004 in Beijing.
97 The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Construction, Liu Zhi Feng, led an investigation team to Jiahe
to break the deadlock. On the following day, officials from the Supervisory Bureau, the Provincial
Procuratorate, and the Land and Natural Resources Bureau arrived and Oriental Horizon, Investigation
on Jiahe’s Demolition III: The Truth Gradually Emerges, [Jiahe Chai Qian Diao Cha Zhi San: Jian Lou
Zhen Xiang], (CCTV television broadcast, May 28, 2004) available at
http://www.cctv/news/china/20040528/101269.shtml.
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each of them got approximately RMB$1700 compensation. The intervention of the
legal team had yielded quick and positive results. The team went to Jiahe on May 27
and the three were released on May 28. The administrative action was launched on
May 31 and compensation was paid on June 1.
The arrested persons were certainly relieved. After being detained for one month
and three days, Lu Shui De, the old man who actively resisted the demolition, was
pleasantly surprised. He recalled that during his detention, the Political and Legal
Committee member from Jiahe had told him that he had committed serious misdeeds
against the Criminal Code and the heaviest form of penalty would be imposed on him.
This would mean three years in prison. In addition, the official said that RMB$5000
had to be deducted from his demolition compensation, and RMB$50,000 had to be
levied on him for what he had “illegally obtained.”98 As a result, it was beyond his
wildest dreams that he would be released in such a relatively short time, let alone
receive compensation. When the three were released, the Public Security Bureau at
Jiahe still defended the arrest as procedurally lawful but by the time that
compensation was paid, their attitude had become apologetic.99
At the same time, Li Jing, the nurse who was the first civil servant to be punished
by the administrative policy was re-instated in her original unit. She got back payment
98 Xiao Shan, supra note 89 at 41.
99 Zeng Peng Yu, Follow up on Jiahe’s Forced Demolition: Arrested Residents Got Compensation, [Jia
He Chai Qian Shi Jian Zhui Zong: Bei Bu Chai Qian Hu Huo De Pei Chang], BEIJING YOUTH DAILY,
June 2, 2005 at http://news.qq.com/a/20040602/000115.htm
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for the six months that her salary had been suspended.100The two sisters who were
divorced registered their marriages to their original spouses.101 The civil servants
who were adversely affected had their grievances addressed and were re-instated in
their work units.
Finally, the Central Government closed the case with some heavy legal
commentary. The People’s Daily, representing the Party directly, condemned outright
the officials at Jiahe for abusing administrative power collectively, and abusing the
use of administrative decrees. It stated clearly that any demolition project in villages
or towns must abide by the law.102 The State Council quickly issued an order,
stipulating that officials should always carry out their duties according to law.103
They should never have participated in the demolition project, and compensation must
be fairly and independently assessed.
The media’s contribution in exposing the grave misdeed was definitive. Equally,
credit to the lawyers was undeniable. The scandal, in itself, was a case heavily laden
with legal complexities. In the initial stage, when CCTV covered the story, a legal
voice was carefully introduced into the public arena. Wang Cai Liang, a legal expert
100 Oriental Horizon, supra note 97.
101 Oriental Horizon, Investigation on Jiahe’s Demolition IV: Correcting Wrongs and Accounting for
Responsibility, [Jiahe Chai Qian Diao Cha Zhi Si: Jiu Cuo Wen Ze], CCTV television broadcast, May
31, 2004, available at http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20040531/100664.shtml.
102 People’s Daily, Development Should Never Be Against Public Interest [Jue Bu Neng Yong Sun Hai
Qun Zhong Li Yi De Fang Shi Gao Jian She], June 5, 2004 at
http://newes.qq.com/a/2004-604/000589.htm.
103 State Council Notification, No. 46, [Guo Wu Yuan Ban Gong Ting Guan Yu Kong Zhi Cheng Zhen
Fang Wu Chai Qian Gui Mo Yan Ge Chai Qian Guan Li De Tong Zhi] June 6, 2004 at
http://law.chinalawinfo.com.
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in demolition and relocation, had outlined the legal framework, explaining the legal
rules to the audience.104 Not knowing the will of higher authorities, he was brave
enough to condemn the legal and administrative abuse committed by the county
officials. In fact, Wang himself went to Jiahe to gain a better understanding of the case
and to seek access to various legal and official documents.105 At a later stage, lawyers
working on a pro bono basis entered the fighting arena.
Having said that, without media exposure, it is highly doubtful whether a legal
case could have been successfully brought. The local residents had previously brought
an action before the municipal court to challenge the demolition and relocation order
and then lost.106 Following this, lawyers from the local region dared not take further
administrative action to challenge the redevelopment plan and the “Four Guarantees,
Two Stops” Order.”107 Sadly, one has to admit that without the media magnifying the
scandal, the law would have been ineffective. Yet relying on the media alone, a
remedy short of legal redress would hardly have been satisfactory and meaningful to
the residents. As noted by one academic, if there is no trial when something unfair has
taken place, the media would stir up public opinion, attract public attention, thus
making such a trial happen.108 In the present case, one of the media’s most significant
104 ORIENTAL HORIZON, supra note 80.
105 Interview with Wang Cailiang, a lawyer, July 16, 2004, Beijing.
106 Id.
107 Interview with Xiao Tai Fu, supra note 96.
108 Li Ying, China’s Public Opinion on Internet and Impartial Judgment, paper presented in
Conference on China-U.S. Public Opinion and Law 2004, jointly held by Centre for International
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contributions was to re-direct the entire debate into a legal discourse. In the end, the
alliance between media and law helped to restore both social and legal justice.
III. MEDIA FREEDOM AS TUG OF WAR
The story seemingly has a happy ending. Scoundrels were ousted, victims got
redressed and heroes were praised. In spite of this, this is not a full victory. All three
journalists who played a major role in the battle lamented that they did not know the
truth. Luo asserted that the Central Government had never stated clearly who should
be accountable in the whole process.109 Yan and Zeng suspected corruption was
involved.110 Both of them remarked that the case was suspicious in the sense that the
most “evil” character got the least punishment. Of the county officials, Zhou Xiang
Yong was the one who slighted Luo; refused to see Zeng; lied in front of the camera
saying that he would reflect on the incident and amended the wrongs,111 but then
rebuked and threatened the residents.112 The punishment for him was suspension
from office for one year, while his colleagues were removed from office.
All in all, public opinion supervision has its limitations. In one sense, the case is a
Communication Studies of Tsinghua University, Tsinghua Law School and Yale Law School, June
19-20, 2004, Tsinghua University, Beijing.
109 Interview with Luo, supra note 70.
110 Interview with Yan, supra note 83; interview with Zeng, supra note 86.
111 Oriental Horizon, supra note 80.
112 Oriental Horizon, supra note 100.
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typical example proving the limitations of the power of the media.113 In another sense,
it also serves as an atypical example that shows how the boundaries of media freedom
can be stretched.
The case confirms also that there are many constraints which bind journalists in
China. First, the power in the media industry is divided according to the forms of
communication. The power of newspapers is not as powerful as that of television
stations. This is partly due to the impact that television programmes have and partly
due to the fact that CCTV is a Party mouthpiece. Discussion on the Web may enjoy
the largest scope for free expression but it is not as influential as television.
Second, the scope of media freedom that an institution enjoys is hierarchical.
Beijing Youth Daily and Beijing News are semi-independent newspapers. They are
audacious cowboys, yet the power that they wield is different from CCTV. It is
difficult for them to get interviews with officials and reporters have to be very careful
in positioning themselves. For example, as mentioned earlier, Luo’s editor reminded
him to cover the story from a softer social angle. Zeng also confessed he always tested
the water first in reporting. For highly sensitive stories, he would put it on the Web.
Though CCTV could adopt a style that is more direct and confrontational, it is also
subordinate to higher authorities. Yan explained that Xinhua News Agency sets the
113 The limitations have been listed in Yuezhi Zhao, supra note 6 at 589.
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ultimate tone for news reporting because once it intervenes, even CCTV has to
succumb to its reporting style. In the case, in which Oriental Outlook, belonging to
Xinhua News Agency, intervened as a mediator, the other news institutions knew that
they could no longer play the role of an advocate or the moral police. The news frame
could be altered completely by Xinhua. In addition, the freedom and the power that
CCTV enjoys are dependent and conditional on the will of governing bodies. When
county officials arrived in Beijing in an attempt to intervene with CCTV’s broadcast
freedom and in which they succeeded temporarily, one journalist deduced that the
county officials must have exercised their influence with high officials in the State
Administration on Radio, Film and Television (SARFT). The latter is a governing
body to which CCTV is subject. When the ban on broadcasting was finally lifted, one
could not help but speculate whether SARFT’s decision had been overridden by the
Central Publicity Department, the direct Party organ governing all media outlets. All
these are unspoken but understood rules, and not all rounds of confrontation could
secure the help or approval of the Central Publicity Department. Yan and another
director of CCTV admitted that sometimes their stories were never broadcast or that
re-broadcasts were never shown.
Third, cross-territorial supervision is a distinct feature. One may recall in our case,
local and regional newspapers failed to publish the story. When Beijing News
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successfully published the story, county officials called its office and asked for Luo to
explain why drafts of reports were not sent to them.114 They blamed Luo, a local from
Hunan, for causing humiliation to the province. Luo simply ignored the county
officials with the help and support of his editors. Being a national body, CCTV’s
jurisdictional power seems to suggest that it has no boundaries within China.
Nevertheless, directors inside CCTV know that Beijing and Shanghai were risky
terrains. One CCTV director, who wished to remain anonymous, pointed out that in
the last 20 years only one official scandal has broken about Shanghai by 2004.115
International news, including reporting on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet
or Xinjiang, belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the official Xinhua News Agency.
Other than cross-territorial supervision by the media, our case also shows evidence of
a similar phenomenon in legal supervision. As mentioned earlier, local lawyers were
not willing to take up legal cases which involved confronting an oppressive local
government.
Furthermore, this is arguably another case of “hitting flies” rather than “hunting
tigers” where county officials were called upon to account, they were criticized
openly and removed swiftly. It remains uncertain whether, if similar transgressions
had been committed by officials higher up the administrative ladder, the media could
114 Interview with Luo, supra note 71.
115 Interview with anonymous director, supra note 118.
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have simulated the story of David against Goliath. Academics have argued that the
media have been used by the Party to achieve social control. Exposure of corruption
cases and other wrongdoings are used to embarrass or intimidate local officials but
not those high in power.116 In doing so, the Party also uses the media as a social
safety valve to release pent up tension and grievances in society and to regain
legitimacy for the Party.117 In essence, public opinion supervision in China is a
controlled and extended form of supervision from the Central authorities, which rarely
reaches those further up the political ladder. Bearing in mind that the media are part of
the Party, it can only watch over those the Party allows it to supervise.
Also it is absolutely forbidden to report issues touching on social stability or
criticism of the Party. Too much negative reporting and exposure may backfire on the
media institution. It is believed that the television programme, Focus, is not as
popular as before because, according to new internal guidelines, only 17% of its
programmes can be critical as compared to 40-50% in the past.118 Another popular
investigative programme called News Probe (Xin Wen Diao Cha) also has to abide by
the guideline that 50% of its programmes can be critical but 50% must be positive.119
This would mean that media freedom depends precariously on the benevolence
116 Perry Keller, “Privilege and Punishment: Press Governance in China,” 21 Cardozo Arts and
Entertainmnet Law Journal 87 (2003).
117 Li, supra note 4 at 400.




and patronage of “enlightened leaders.”120 As evidenced in the case, it was the
intervention of officials from the Ministry of Construction, a central body, that
marked the watershed in the battle. Polumbaum commented that the accomplishment
of crusading journalism in China often required either political backing or benign
neglect from the authorities.121 Without such, the chemistry of this media experiment
might be very different. Media exposure and legal intervention might fail to serve as
the right catalysts to bring justice. The scandal would have remained a misery that
many in China have to live with. It might have been the case that some would lament,
“even thunder would not be able to strike a blow” (lei ye da bu dong).
The result is that Chinese journalists remain shackled by political edicts and
unspoken commands. Despite the above, it is important not to belittle the heroic
efforts of many Chinese journalists and the powerful impact of public opinion. The
magic power of the media is admired and very well recognized. It has been said that
“Thirteen minutes of TV could have addressed 10 years of grievances.” Officials in
China, it is argues, do not fear being told off by their supervisors, nor do they fear
going to court. They only fear getting into the newspapers.122
The above apparently verifies the notion that media freedom in China can only
survive within defined boundaries and limits. One might even conclude that media
120 Chin-chuan Lee, China’s Journalism: the Emancipatory Potential of Social Theory, 1:4
JOURNALISM STUDIES 559 at 563 (2000).
121 Polumbaum, supra note 30 at 36.
122 Polumbaum, supra note 30 at 59.
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freedom is a form of sophisticated social control by the Party. In spite of that, it would
be too early to end on this cynical and pessimistic note. Even “hitting flies” in China
is a risky yet noble task. With a population of 1.3 billion of which nearly 60% are
living in rural areas,123 it is the unrestrained authority of local party chiefs that is
most oppressive to hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese. A study reveals that in
1998, more than two thirds of 40,000 officials investigated in corruption charges were
indicted in cases in which more than U.S. $534 million was involved.124 Media
exposure of corruption, even at a lower level of political hierarchy, has a definite
positive impact on the livelihood of ordinary people.
In addition, one should not overlook that the Jiahe case serves as an interesting
paradox to illustrate the push and pull in the tug of war to gain media freedom. A
unique feature of this case is that local officials never took the media seriously. At the
initial stage, government officials simply dismissed the small press. Facing CCTV,
they lied. This initial arrogant attitude and the underestimation of media influence
only served to prove the powerful potential of the young guard dog in China. The
neglect of the local officials gave much leeway for the media to test the water.
Journalists in China are known to be skilful in the game of “playing edge balls”
(cha bian qiu). It refers to the risky and difficult table tennis strategy of aiming the
123 National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004 China Statistical Yearbook at
http://www..stats.gov.cn/english/statisticdata/yearlydata/yb.2004-e/indexeh.htm (last accessed on June
9, 2005).
124 Li, supra note 4 at 400.
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ball so that it barely nicks the far edge of the opponent’s side, almost out of bounds
but remains a fair hit.125 In the media game, facing unpredictable rules, journalists
venture to the edge of the permissible. As stated by Zeng of Beijing Youth Daily, he
would never drop a bomb no matter how newsworthy the story was. He would test the
water by giving his story a 10% go in the first release.126 He gave the example that
during the SARS epidemic, the media were not allowed to report the event. Their
newspaper just mentioned that masks were sold out in Beijing in one single afternoon.
On the coverage of AIDS in China, a taboo topic several years ago, Zeng wrote a
story about two wealthy guys who contracted AIDS through prostitutes. It was not a
direct report on people selling blood and contracting AIDS but once Zeng’s story got
public attention, the news just rolled on. Luo of Beijing News abided faithfully to the
rule that his first story must be tackled from a social, rather than political angle. Only
in this way could stories be published
Fortunately, the story of Jiahe did “roll on” onto television and onto the Web.
Yan said that when he got the notification that his investigation report would not be
re-broadcast, he knew that strictly speaking, the transcript of the programme should
not be put on the Web which they used to do. However, his team deliberately broke
the rule and posted the entire story on the Web. Rather than merely focusing on the
125 Lee, supra note 41 at 244 and Judy Polumbaum, Striving for Predictability: The Bureaucratization
of Media Management in China, in CHINA’S MEDIA, MEDIA’S CHINA 113 at 116 (Chin-Chuan Lee, ed.,
1994).
126 Interview with Zeng, supra note 86.
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Jiahe’s incident, their team also did a programme on the general problem of
demolition in China. This was to keep the issue alive and to keep a critical voice in
the public sphere.
Despite the red light hoisted by the officials mid way in the battle, the three
major players had also mustered the support of others in the media industry. Rival
teams inside CCTV turned out to be comrades. Reporting and discussion on the web
was influential and crucial.
Local residents also joined the fight. Though their attitudes to reporters were
lukewarm before CCTV broadcast its programme, they were very supportive
afterwards. After the report by Oriental Horizon was suspended, citizens secretly
taped the procedures in a town hall meeting on May 15, 2004, which recorded how
party officials reprimanded and threatened local residents. This tape was handed to
reporters later and broadcast on Oriental Horizon. This is a reflection of how people
are learning to use the media by tipping off reporters and contributing to the
“emergence of a nascent discourse of rights.”127
In order to contest the boundaries set by the ruling regime, the media are armed
with legal principles. Though the media and law are often seen as instruments of the
Party, the alliance between them has played out a powerful duet that can not be
127 DE BURGH, supra note 2 at 807.
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ignored. With growing awareness of the significance of law, the legitimacy of official
conduct will be questioned, if not in the courts, under the spotlight of the media.
Thus, the battle for media freedom is a tug of war between the media and those
in political power. The media could recruit help from the legal sector and from the
grassroots to be on its side but it is not an easily won battle. In fact, the rules and
outcome of each round are unknown. It is a game of social management from the
perspective of the ruler and the media, depending on the dynamics of forces and
countervailing forces at any one particular time.
CONCLUSION
The story of Jiahe reveals that the Chinese media is not as independent as one
would like to see. In the attempt to circumvent official public opinion supervision, an
intense competition to frame the dispute commenced. The unofficial press framed it as
an unusual social phenomenon of a sudden rise of the divorce rate in a small county.
The Party media framed it firmly as a quest for legal justice. In stark contrast, the
Party authorities at one level framed it as a case of mere misunderstandings created by
local officials, who were otherwise basically well intentioned.
Putting the above variations aside, to the media, the central question is always to
make “the invisible visible”128 so as to confront the ruling regime but within safe
128 Lippmann, supra note 77 at 241.
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boundaries. It fights to transform a grievance into a social event and is eager to
summon the “Court of Public Opinion.”129 Amidst the numerous cases of relocation,
the media managed to transform the Jiahe story from a day-to-day story in the chaotic
world of urban redevelopment into a case of grave legal misdeeds. In this process,
China’s media has formed a closed coalition with the legal sector. Together, they have
nurtured a close-knit network with the mass, fostering a culture of participation and
openness. Despite the fact that the Jiahe story is an ad hoc attempt to secure property
rights, the solidarity that they have built has given a voice to the aggrieved parties for
the attainment of legal justice.
In this given context, public opinion supervision can be a form of genuine media
supervision, representing a unique discourse in China. It takes place under the
shadow of political guidance, but with market liberalization, growing awareness of
legal rights, and mass support. The media is forming a coalition with other forces in
society. It is negotiating its position in the arena of public opinion and generating a
form of media monitoring of Chinese society, especially for local politics. The critical
issue is to attain the careful and delicate balance between dependency and autonomy
within the power hierarchy. This is indeed a dangerous game. The media is powerful
and vulnerable at the same time. In fact, Beijing News, one of the principal actors in
129 Lippmann, supra note 77 at 229.
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the Jiahe story got itself into trouble after the events described here.130
Despite a note of caution and reservation, what is certain is that the liberalizing
force of the market has triggered a quiet revolution in the media sector and has
opened up a new breathing space for the general public. China’s media are no longer
faithful lapdogs, nor a mere propaganda conduit between the Party and the people.
The voice from the media is gradually gaining its own steady momentum. It is on its
way to providing a form of genuine media supervision of society. Journalists have
been pushing for changes and accountability. Politics, corruption, the abuse of power,
and people’s livelihoods have been put firmly on the media agenda.
Therefore, rather than seeing media freedom as an outcome of social control, it is
more the product of social management. In the attempt to gather and align with the
public, the media are gaining the clout to influence authorities with different allies.
Winning for the media may mean slowing down at times but never abandoning their
course. The guard dog may defer but not submit to the authorities.
130 BBC Monitoring, supra note 10.
